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Reversed Economics and Inhumanity of Development Assistance in Africa
Abstract
Purpose –  The purpose of  this  paper  is  to  assess  the  aid-development  nexus in  52 African 
countries using updated data(1996-2010) and a new indicator of human development(adjusted 
for inequality). 
Design/methodology/approach – The estimation technique used is a Two-Stage-Least Squares 
Instrumental Variable approach. Instruments include: income-levels, legal-origins and religious-
dominations. The first-step consists of justifying the choice of the estimation technique with a 
Hausman-test for endogeneity. In the second-step, we verify that the instrumental variables are 
exogenous  to  the  endogenous  components  of  explaining  variables(aid  dynamic  channels) 
conditional on other covariates(control variables). In the third-step, the strength and  validity of 
the instruments  are  examined with the Cragg-Donald and Sargan overidentifying  restrictions 
tests respectively. Robustness checks are ensured by: (1) the use of alternative aid indicators; (2) 
estimation under restricted and unrestricted hypotheses ; and (3) adoption of two interchangeable 
sets of instruments.
Findings – The findings broadly indicate  that development assistance is detrimental to GDP 
growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development. Given concerns on 
the achievement of the MDGs,  the relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign 
aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in Africa.
Social implications – It is a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is 
high  time  economists  and policy  makers  start  rethinking  the  models  and  theories  on  which 
foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid 
agencies accountable for piecemeal results.
Originality/value – These findings are based on data collected after pioneering works on the 
aid-development  nexus.  Usage  of  the  inequality  adjusted  human  development  index  first 
published in 2010, corrects past works of the bunch of criticisms inherent in the first index. 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa
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1.Introduction
Over  five  decades  since  the  Official  Development  Assistance(ODA)  programs  were 
instituted,  the  concern  over  the  effectiveness  of  foreign  aid  remains  widely  debated  and 
unsolved.  In 2005 the West tried hardest to save Africa. In July of that year, the G8 agreed to 
double foreign aid to Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion to finance the ‘Big push’, as  
well as cancel African aid-loans contracted during previous attempts at a ‘Big push’. Before this 
effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive region in the world. In September of that same 
year, world leaders gathered at the United Nations to further discuss progress on ending poverty 
in the continent. To point out some frustrating statistics, sub-Saharan Africa contains 11% of the 
world’s population, but produces only 1% of the world’s GDP(Easterly, 2005a). In the median 
African nation, 43% of the population live on less than one dollar a day. On the World Food 
Program list, of the 23 countries with more than 35% of the population malnourished, 17 are in 
Africa. The long and brutal civil wars in Angola, Chad, Somalia, Sierra Leon, Liberia…etc, not 
to  mention  Rwanda’s  genocide  and  recent  carnages  in  Darfur-Sudan  and  the  Democratic 
Republic of Congo (registering the world’s highest war casualties since World War II). In fact, 
seven of the eight recent cases of total societal breakdown into anarchy in the world known to 
literature  have  been in  Africa:  Angola,  Burundi,  Liberia,  Sudan,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia  and 
Zaire/Congo(beside Afghanistan).
Much literature has focused on the macroeconomic impact of aid, but mixed results have 
been reported and those that have revealed significant positive effects face heavy methodological 
criticisms. In assessing the impact of development assistance, a great chunk of studies focus on 
the effect of aid-flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables(investment or public 
consumption). The underlying assumption here is the notion that aid is destined to bridge the 
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saving-investment  gap  poor  countries  face(Rostow,1960;  Chenery  &  Strout,1966;  Easterly, 
2005a).  Surprisingly there has been much less research conducted on the impact of foreign aid 
on the evolution of human development(Masud & Yontcheva,2005), in spite of the change in 
objectives  announced  by  the  donor  community   which  have  evolved  from  intensive 
industrialization programs advocated in the 1950s to more recent poverty-reducing objectives 
such as the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs). With 2015 drawing nigh, it is imperative to 
assess  the  donors’  objective  of  reaching  the  MDGs.  In  plainer  terms,  investigating  the 
effectiveness of development assistance on Human Development in developing countries in the 
run-up to 2015 could provide crucial policy options to donor and multilateral agencies on their 
assistance impact.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. Firstly, we cut adrift existing 
literature and assess the aid-development nexus from three dimensions (GDP growth , GDP per 
capita growth and human development). Another important fact worth pointing out is the use of 
a hitherto human development measure absent in the literature: the Inequality Adjusted Human 
Development  Index(IHDI) first published in the 2010 Human Development Report. Secondly, a 
great bulk of the literature is based on data collected between 1960 and 1995. By using recent 
data(1996-2010), this paper provides an updated account of trends in the nexus. Also, results 
from recent data will enable a more robust projection on the MDGs. Thirdly, our focus on 52 of 
the 54 countries in Africa provides a universal view on the continent where the aid-development 
debate is most tensed. The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 
2 presents the literature on aid effectiveness. Data and methodology are presented and described 
respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2.Literature review
2.1 Theoretical highlights 
The  focus  on  if  aid  improves  GDP  growth  can  be  traced  back  to  the  two-gap 
model(Chenery & Strout, 1966), which remains the most influential theoretical underpinning of 
the aid effectiveness literature. In this model, developing countries face constraints on savings 
and export earnings that deter investment and economic growth. In spite of the severe criticisms 
since  its  inception,  this  model  has  provided  the  underlying  principles  both  for  early   aid 
policies(Easterly,  1999)  and  regression  specifications  of  a  great  many  aid-growth(savings) 
empirical papers (Masud & Yontcheva,2005). 
2.2 Conflicts in the literature 
The literature on the effectiveness of aid has almost  exclusively been focused on the 
macroeconomic impacts of aid, assessing the effects of aid on economic savings, investment and 
growth. The lack of analytical framework, heavy reliance on empirical evidence(which is often 
ambiguous  at  best)  and  inconclusive   results  with  recently  refined  methodologies(Masud  & 
Yontcheva,2005), leaves the subject matter widely open to debate. For the purpose of clarity, 
literature pertaining to the effectiveness of aid on growth(development) could be clubbed into 
two strands as summarized in Table 1: one advocating the negative consequences of aid and the 
other acknowledging the positive rewards of development assistance. 
The first strand entails authors presenting the case for the insignificant impact of aid on 
investment,  savings  or  growth.  Aid  has  been  shown  to  improve  unproductive  public 
consumption(Mosley  et  al.,1992)  and fails  to  increase  investment.  This  later  point  has  been 
supported  by Boone(1996) and Reichel(1995). Ghura(1995) pointed to the negative effect of aid 
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on domestic savings while Pedersen (1996) asserts, foreign aid distorts development and leads to 
aid dependency. 
In the  second strand,  we find  studies  favoring positive  effects  of  aid  on growth and 
development. Among these works, we shall highlight that of   Burnside & Dollar(2000) who 
conclude that aid can be effective when policies are good. The Burnside & Dollar(2000) work 
has  received  abundant  comments  from researchers(Guillaumont  & Chauvet,  2001;  Colier  & 
Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003), whose results have been challenged as being “extremely data 
dependent”(Clemens et al.,2004). 
Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature
 Researchers Main findings 
First-strand: Aid does not lead to growth(development)
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid increases unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth.
Reichel(1995) Aid fails to promote savings owing to the substitution effect.
Ghura(1995) Aid negatively impacts savings.
Boone(1996) Aid  is  insignificant  in  improving  economic  development  for  two  reasons: 
poverty is not caused by capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians to 
adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows.
Pedersen (1996) Foreign Aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency.
Second-strand : Aid improves growth(development)
Burnside & Dollar(2000) Aid can be effective when policies and economic management are good.
Ghura(1995) Aids positively impacts savings for good adjusters. 
Guillaumont &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on environmental factors(shocks and hazards).
Collier & Dehn(2001) Aid effectiveness  depends on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid contingent 
on negative supply shocks is better than targeting based on good policies. 
Collier & Dollar(2001) The positive effect of aid on poverty depends on its impact on per-capita
income growth and the impact of per-capita income growth on poverty
reduction.
Feeny (2003) The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly
in line with a strategy to effectively reduce poverty and increase human
well-being. 
Gomanee et al.(2003) Aid  has  either  a  direct  effect  on  welfare  and  indirect  effect  through  public 
spending on social services. 
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-term positive impact on growth.
Ishfaq (2004) Foreign aid, in a limited way though, has helped in reducing the
extent of poverty in Pakistan.
Mosley et al. (2004) Foreign assistance has an indirect impact on poverty and the well-being of
recipient countries.
Addison et al. (2005) Aid increases pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth. 
Aid broadly works to  mitigate  poverty,  and  poverty would be higher  in  the 
absence of aid.
Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive impact of aid on development outcomes. 
Source(Author)
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2.3  African perspective
2.3.1 Africa’s needs and Western responses 
The bulk of African countries lie low on standard international comparisons. In line with 
Easterly(2005a),  they  occupy  most  of  the  bottom  places  in  income  per  capita,  percent  of 
population  living  in extreme poverty(less  than one US dollar  a  day),  life  expectancy,  infant 
mortality,  literacy,  AIDS prevalence  and the  HDI.  The last  four  decades  has  been those of 
extreme growth disappointment  in Africa.  The West  has  responded to Africa’s  tragedy with 
intensive  involvement  of  foreign  aid  agencies  and  international  organizations.  On  average 
African countries receive much more aid as a percentage of their GDPs than other developing 
countries. The West does more because Africa is poor, however its efforts are supposed to have a 
positive impact on the GDPs of recipient countries.
The year 2005 was that during which the West tried hardest to save Africa. In July of that 
year, the G8 agreed to double foreign aid to Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion in a bid 
to finance the ‘Big push’, as well as cancel African aid-loans contracted during previous attempts 
at a ‘Big push’. Before this effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive region in the world. 
In September of that same year, world leaders gathered at the United Nations to further discuss 
progress on ending poverty in Africa. To point out some frustrating statistics, sub-Saharan Africa 
contains  11% of  the  world’s  population,  but  produces  only 1% of  the  world’s  GDP. In the 
median African nation, 43% of the population live on less than one dollar a day. On the World 
Food Program list, of the 23 countries with more than 35% of the population malnourished, 17 
are in Africa. Also, human development has been greatly hampered by the long and brutal civil 
wars in Angola, Chad, Somalia, Sierra Leon, Liberia…etc, not to mention Rwanda’s genocide 
and recent carnages in Darfur-Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo(registering the world’s 
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highest  war casualties  since World War II).  In fact,  seven of the eight  recent  cases of total 
societal breakdown into anarchy in the world known to literature have been in Africa: Angola, 
Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zaire/Congo(beside Afghanistan). 
2.3.2 Theories and empirics of Western assistance to Africa
a)The Big-Push models and foreign aid
Borrowing from Easterly(2005a), ‘Big-Push’ models suggest that Africa is poor because 
it is stuck in a “poverty trap”. To emerge from the poverty trap, it needs a large aid-financed 
increase in investment: a ‘Big Push’. Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth models have 
been used to discuss the mechanisms on circumstances surrounding the poverty trap. The first 
mechanism is that, savings are quite low for people who are very close to subsistence(as would 
be predicted by a Stone-Geary utility function). In a closed economy saving equals investment, 
therefore investment  is low. In the Harrod-Domar model  with the capital  constraint binding, 
growth of GDP per capita is simply a linear function of the investment(=saving) rate minus the 
population and depreciation rates. If the saving is quite low to compensate for population growth 
and the depreciation of per capita, then per capita growth will be zero or negative. In the 1950s 
and  1960s,  early  development  economists  postulated  a  desirable  per  capita  growth  rate  and 
calculated  the  “investment  requirement”  to  meet  this  target:  the  distance  between  the  low 
domestic saving rate and the “investment requirement” was termed the “Financing Gap”. The 
role of aid was to cover the Financing Gap(Rostow,1960; Chenery & Strout,1966). Therefore 
this model predicted a strong growth effect for foreign aid through its role in boosting domestic 
investment above what domestic savings would finance. Although this model soon went out of 
favor  in  the  academic  literature  on  development,  it  remained  interesting  in  international 
organizations like the World Bank. Current policies advocating for the promotion of foreign aid 
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to  Africa  have  explicitly  cited  this  model(Devarajan  et  al.,  2002  at  the  World  Bank;  Blair 
Commission on Africa,2005; Sachs, 2005).  Sach(2005) argues: “success in ending the poverty  
trap will be much easier than it appears”. He foretells, increase in foreign aid and debt relief can 
end Africa’s poverty in our generation. In a closed economy, savings depend not only on the 
distance from subsistence but also on the incentive to save depending on the rate of return to 
saving and investment.  In  an  open economy,  investment  is  not  only a  function  of  domestic 
saving but also depends on the rate of return to investment. As shown by  Collier et al.,(2001), 
Africa’s extensive capital flight is estimated at 39%. Thus, this large chunk of Africa’s capital 
stock is held outside the continent because domestic investors compare the returns to domestic 
and foreign investments before investment decisions. More so bank lenders will invest in the 
economy if returns are attractive enough. In the Solow model, a strong relationship  between 
income and savings rates could generate multiple equilibria at low and high levels of capital 
stock, resurfacing the possibility of a poverty trap. Again, the low domestic savings would not be 
a  qualm  in  an  open  economy  in  which  investment  responds  to  incentives.   Kraay  & 
Raddatz(2005)  have shown that the relationship between initial capital and saving must follow 
an S-shaped curve to generate a poverty-trap; however they fail to find evidence for this shape in 
the data. 
The  second  mechanism on  poverty  is  some  kind  of  nonconvexity  of  the  production 
function in the Solow model. There could be strong external economies to investment or there 
maybe  high fixed costs to investment projects such that a minimum threshold must be surpassed 
for investment to be productive. This notion was part of the inspiration for the original article 
that first proposed a ‘Big Push’(Rosentein-Rodan,1943). This strand has had a longer shelf-life 
in the academic literature than the “Financing Gap” model because theorists have a great zeal in 
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models  with  multiple  equilibira(  Murphy et  al.,  1989).  In  emphasizing  such nonconvexities, 
Sach(2005) suggests that Africa is in a poverty trap. ‘Big Push’ models predict strong effects of 
aid  on  investment  and growth(development).  This  prediction  has  been the  subject  of  a  vast 
empirical literature which this paper has already detailed above(see Table 1). 
b)Project interventions: education and health
Another view of Africa’s poverty has been that, it results from low human capital(poor 
health and education) and infrastructure. This emphasis which began in the 1960s is still a  major 
theme in explaining Africa’s poverty. While enrollments have expanded rapidly, the quality of 
education  is  hampered  by  missing  inputs  like  textbooks  and  other  school  material,  weak 
incentives for teachers,  corruption in education bureaucracies and disruption of schooling by 
political  crisis(Filmer & Pritchett,  1997).  In health, some of the initial  progress has slowed, 
possibly  due  to  corruption  in  the  health  system(  studies  in  Cameroon,  Guinea,  Uganda and 
Tanzania estimated that 30 to 70% of government drugs disappeared before reaching patients). 
Also,  there  are  more  complicated  health  problems  that  cannot  be  solved  with  routine 
methods(Filmer et al., 2000; Pritchett & Woolcock,2004). 
c)Policies and growth models 
The structural  adjustment  program is   another  view of  why Africa remains  poor  .  It 
gained prominence in the early 1980s with the advent of the “Washington consensus” and the 
‘pro-free  market’  arguments  from personalities  like  the  World  Bank  chief  economist  Anne 
Krueger.  According  to  this  view,  Africa  is  poor  because  its  governments  have  chosen  bad 
policies. Indeed, it is obvious that many African governments pursued policies very destructive 
of  growth  and  economic  development:  artificially  overvalued  currencies,  high  black  market 
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premiums on foreign exchange, controls on interest rates that led to negative real interest rates 
for savers, drastic restrictions on international trade and reliance on state enterprise. This ‘bad 
policies’ view of Africa’s poverty led to a different  perception of the role of aid. The role of 
Western donors and international institutions within this framework was to induce changes in 
African  macroeconomic  policies  by  making  aid  conditional  on  such  changes.  Structural 
adjustment loans of the IMF and the World Bank were therefore embodied in this approach: 
which  had as  objective  an  “adjustment  with  growth”.   How successful  were  these  loans  in 
facilitating  “adjustment”,  that  is  to  say:  changing policy?  How successful  was  development 
assistance  in  inducing  better   policies?  The  answer  appears  to  be  that  Western  donors  and 
international institutions were not very successful in changing policy(Alesina & Dollar, 2002; 
Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Van de Walle, 2001; Easterly,2005b). However answers from these 
studies are based on old data. The current paper uses updated data to find new answers, if any.  
d)Aid, institutions and development
A large literature on institutions and development suggests that Africa is poor because it 
has poor institutions: dictatorship, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract enforcement, 
violence and political instability,  hostile regulatory environment for private business and high 
inflation. In a bid to end African poverty, according to this view the West needs to promote good 
institutions.  Svensson(2000)  finds  that  aid  increases  corruption  in  ethnically  fractionalized 
countries(which  is the situation of most African states). Knack(2001) discovers that higher aid 
worsens  bureaucratic  quality,  leads  to  violating  the  law  with  more  impunity  and  more 
corruption(controlling for potential reverse causality). Similarly, Djankov et al.(2005) find that 
high aid caused setbacks to democracy between 1960-1999. Indeed they found aid’s effect on 
democracy to be worse than that of the “natural resource curse”. 
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e) Dysfunctional donors 
According to Westerly(2005a), while all the attention in the aid and development debate 
is focused on Africa, it is also interesting to assess how effective donors have been at delivering 
valuable services to Africa? There have been alarming signs of donor dysfunction. A case in 
point is the over 2 billion US dollars spent on roads in Tanzania over the last 20 years. Yet roads 
have  not  improved.  Even  by bureaucratic  standards,  foreign  aid  bureaucracy is  dire.  Why?. 
Perhaps it is because efforts and results in aid are largely unobservable and noticed only by the 
voiceless poor. Thus, the lack of results visibility makes aid bureaucracies unaccountable. Unlike 
private firms or democratic governments in rich countries, aid agencies do not face a “voter test” 
or “ a market test”.  Africa’s poor could be conceived as political  orphans; with no voice or 
feedback on whether aid is helping them and nobody accountable to them. 
2.4 The scope of the current paper
2.4.1  Scope of development assistance 
Borrowing  from  Clement  et  al.(2004),  aggregate  aid   could  be  divided  into  three 
categories: (1) emergency and humanitarian aid(likely to be negatively correlated with growth); 
(2) aid that affects growth only over the long-term(if at all); such as aid to support democracy, 
the environment, health or education; and (3) aid that plausibly could stimulate growth in the 
long term, including budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure and 
aid for productive  sectors  such as  agricultural  and industrial.  While  aid effectiveness  papers 
implicitly define donors’ objective as solely the promotion of economic growth or the reduction 
of poverty in the recipient countries, a parallel strand of literature on aid allocation has shown 
that most donors often pursue a different underlying agenda: allocating aid according to their 
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own strategic interest. Masud & Yontcheva (2005) have pointed-out that if a significant part of 
aid  is  allocated  for  strategic  purposes,  no  positive  impact  in  terms  of  growth  or  poverty 
alleviation  should  be  expected.  We partially  refute  this  claim  by asserting  that,  foreign  aid 
irrespective  of  vested  donor-interest  should  contribute  to  development  or  economic 
deterioration(even in marginal terms) either directly or indirectly. 
2.4.2  Contribution of this paper to the literature 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold: use of a novel measure of the 
HDI;  analysis  with  more  updated  data  and;  broad but  exclusive  focus  on Africa.  Firstly,  as 
suggested by Boone(1996), aid effectiveness should not only be measured by its impact on GDP 
growth. Contrary to existing literature, we examine the impact of aid on GDP growth , GDP per 
capita growth and human development. Therefore, our analysis can both capture GDP growth 
and human development targeted development assistance. Another important fact worth pointing 
out is the use of the Inequality Adjusted Human Development  Index(IHDI) first published in the 
2010 Human Development Report. While past research on the aid-development nexus has used 
the HDI unadjusted for inequality, this paper is to the best of our knowledge the first that uses 
the IHDI in the aid-development assessment. Secondly, a great chunk of the literature is based on 
data collected between 1960 and 1995. By using recent data(1996-2010), this paper provides an 
updated account of current trends in the nexus. Also results from recent data will enable a more 
robust projection on the MDGs. Thirdly, we focus mainly on Africa where the aid-development 
debate  is  most  tensed.  While  previous  studies  have  mixed  countries  in  various  continental 
regions  or focused on a restricted set of countries owing to constraints in data availability, this 
paper uses data on 52 of the 54 African countries. 
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3.Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We examine  a  panel  of  52   African  countries  with  data  from African  Development 
Indicators(ADI) of the World Bank(WB). Details of summary statistics(Appendix 1), correlation 
analysis(Appendix 2), variable definitions(Appendix 3) and presentation of countries(Appendix 
4) are found in the appendices. In a bid to obtain results with more updated policy implications, 
dataset spans from 1996 to 2010. Dependent variables include: GDP growth, GDP per capita 
growth  and  IHDI  while  independent  variables  are  dynamics  in  Net  Official  Development 
Assistance(NODA). For robustness purposes we use three measures of NODA: total  NODA, 
NODA  from  multilateral  donors  and  NODA  from  the  Development  Assistance 
Committee(DAC) countries. In the regressions we control for  population growth rate, regulation 
quality, democracy and public investment. The choice of control variables is constrained by the 
degrees  of  freedom  necessary  for  overidentifying  restrictions  tests  at  second-stage 
regressions(more than two control variables will result in exact or under-identification; meaning 
instruments  are  either  equal  to  or  less  than  the  number  of  endogenous  explaining  variables 
respectively). Instrumental variables are: income-levels, religious-dominations and  legal-origins. 
These instruments have been largely documented in the economic development literature (La 
Porta et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2011ab).
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity 
While  development  assistance  has  a  bearing  on  the  development  of  the  recipient 
country(Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al.,2006), the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out as aid 
from donor agencies(countries)  is  conditional  on development(institutional)  characteristics  of 
14
recipient countries. Such factors maybe environmental(Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001), supply-
shocks(Collier  &  Dehn,  2001)  or  even  effective  policies  and  economic  management 
standards(Burnside & Dollar, 2000). We are thus faced with an issue of endogeneity owing to 
reverse-causality and omitted variables, since the NODA indicators are correlated with the error 
term  in  the  equation  of  interest.  To  address  this  issue  we  shall  confirm  the  presence  of 
endogeneity with the Hausman-test and  employ an estimation technique that takes account of 
the endogeneity issue. 
3.2.2 Estimation technique 
In accordance with Beck et al.(2003) and recent African law-finance literature(Asongu, 
2011cd)  the  paper  adopts  an  Instrumental  Variable(IV)  estimation  method.  IV  estimation 
addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients 
by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error 
term in the main equation. In line with Asongu (2011cde), the Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) 
estimation method adopted by this study  will entail the following steps.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegalorigiNODA )(10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ  υα ++ itiX      (1)            
                                                                                                
Second-stage regression:
++= itit NODAGrowth )(10 γγ +itiXβ   µ                                                              (2) 
In the two equations, X is a set of  control variables. For the first and second equations,  v 
and u, respectively  denote  the  disturbance  terms.  Instrumental  variables  are  legal-origins, 
dominant-religions and income-levels. NODA stands for Net Official Development Assistance. 
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We adopt the following steps in the analysis: 
-justify  the  choice  of  a  TSLS over  an  OLS estimation  technique  with the Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
- show the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables (aid 
channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
-ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with 
an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.
3.2.3 Robustness checks
To ensure robustness in the analysis, the following checks will be carried-out: (1) usage 
of alternative indicators of aid; (2) employment of two distinct interchangeable sets of moment 
conditions that encompass every category of the instruments; (3) usage of alternative indicators 
of growth and development; (4) account for the concern of endogeneity; (5) regressions under 
both restricted and unrestricted hypotheses. 
4.Empirical analysis
This section addresses the ability of the exogenous components of NODA dynamics to 
account for differences in human development, GDP growth and GDP per capita growth; the 
ability  of  the  instruments  to  explain  variations  in  the  endogenous  components  of  NODA 
dynamics and the possibility of the instruments to account for growth and human development 
beyond  NODA  dynamic  channels.  To  make  these  assessments,  we  use  the  panel  TSLS-IV 
estimation method with legal-origins, income-levels, and religious-dominations as instrumental 
variables. 
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4.1 Development assistance and instruments 
Table  2  below  assesses  the  validity  of  the  instruments  in  explaining  cross-country 
differences in NODA dynamics. 
Table 2: First-stage regressions
Net Official Development Assistance(NODA)
NODAgdp NODAMDgdp NODADACgdp
1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 2nd Set 
Instruments 
Constant 3.675* -1.244 1.835** -1.237* 1.794 0.007
(1.889) (-0.740) (2.271) (-1.771) (1.381) (0.006))
English  1.009 --- 0.677 --- 0.294 ---
(0.928) (1.500) (0.405)
French --- -1.009 --- -0.677 --- -0.294
(-0.928) (-1.500) (-0.405)
Christianity 2.084* --- 0.081 --- 2.051*** ---
(1.901) (0.178) (2.801)
Islam --- -2.084* --- -0.081 --- -2.051***
(-1.901) (-0.178) (-2.801)
L.Income --- 8.014*** --- 3.831*** --- 4.132***
(6.102) (7.022) (4.710)
M. Income -9.093*** --- -4.112*** --- -4.924*** ---
(-6.051) (-6.587) (-4.905)
LMIncome 1.079 --- 0.281 --- 0.792 ---
(0.674) (0.422) (0.740)
UMIncome --- -1.079 --- -0.281 --- -0.792
(-0.674) (-0.422) (-0.740)
Control 
Variables 
Popg 3.342*** 3.342*** 1.559*** 1.559*** 1.755*** 1.755***
(5.784) (5.784) (6.496) (6.496) (4.548) (4.548)
Regulation -2.377*** -2.377*** -0.739** -0.739** -1.625*** -1.625***
(-2.811) (-2.811) (-2.106) (-2.106) (-2.877) (-2.877)
Adjusted R² 0.257 0.257 0.285 0.285 0.193 0.193
Fisher Statistics 32.845*** 32.845*** 37.627*** 37.627*** 22.922*** 22.922***
Observations 551 551 551 551 551 551
L:  Low.  LM:  Lower  Middle.  UM:  Upper  Middle.  Ivt:  Investment.  Pop:  population.  *;**;***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1% 
respectively.  NODAgdp: NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp:NODA from Multilateral  Donors  on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA  from DAC 
countries on GDP.  Student statistics ratios in brackets. 1st Set: First  Set of Instruments . 2nd Set: Second Set of Instruments.
Clearly,  it  could  be  observed  that  distinguishing  African  countries  by  legal-origins, 
income  levels  and  religious-dominations  help  explain  cross-country  differences   in  NODA. 
Based on the Fisher-test, the instruments taken together enter significantly in all regressions at 
the 1% significance level.  Broadly the following findings could be established. (1) Christian-
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dominant countries have received more aid than their Islam-oriented counterparts. (2) Consistent 
with common sense and economic theory,  Low-income countries are prone to more aid than 
Middle-income  countries.  The  control  variables  are  significant  with  the  right  signs  as 
development-aid  increases  with  population  growth  and  decreases  with  improvement  in 
regulation quality(which ensures better management and distribution of national wealth). 
4.2  Human development, growth and development assistance 
Table 3 investigates two main issues: (1) the ability of NODA channels to account for 
development  dynamics  and  (2)  the  possibility  of  the  instrumental  variables  explaining 
development  dynamics  beyond  NODA  channels.   Whereas  we  address  the  first  issue  by 
assessing the significance of estimated coefficients, the second is investigated with the Cragg-
Donald  and  Sargan-OIR  tests  for  instrument  strength  and  validity  respectively.  The  null 
hypothesis of the Sargan test is the view that the instruments account for development dynamics 
only through NODA channels. Thus  a rejection of the null hypothesis is the rejection of the 
view that  the  instruments  explain  development  dynamics  through no other  mechanisms than 
NODA channels. The null hypothesis of Cragg-Donald test is the stance that the instruments are 
weak; thus its rejection points to the strength of the instruments at first-stage regressions.   The 
Hausman-test for endogeneity precedes the IV regressions and thus justifies the choice of the 
estimation  technique.  The null  hypothesis  of  this  test  is  the position  that  OLS estimates  are 
efficient and consistent. Therefore a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the issue of reverse 
causality (endogeneity) we have elucidated earlier (see Section 3.2.1) and hence lends credit to 
the choice of a TSLS-IV estimation technique.  Otherwise we model by OLS. For robustness 
purposes, results are replicated using an alternative set of instrumental variables, as depicted in 
the second and third to the last lines of Table 3. In the unrestricted regressions of Table 3, the 
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null hypothesis of the Hausman-test is rejected for all the regressions; confirming the presence of 
endogeneity and hence the choice of the TSLS-IV approach.
With  regard  to  the  first  concern  which  is  addressed by the  significance  of  estimated 
coefficients,  it  can  firmly  be  established  that  NODA  dynamics  significantly  decrease 
development and growth in Africa. The negative effect is most in aid from Multilateral donors 
and   more  in  aid  from DAC countries.  These  results  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  aid-
development  literature  on  developing  countries(Boone,1996;  Reichel,1995;  Ghura,1995; 
Pedersen,1996). 
Table 3: Second-stage regressions(Unrestricted)
Human  Development GDP growth GDP per capita growth
Constant 5.530 5.295 5.663 -1.832 -1.822 -1.906 -2.214 -2.208 -2.326
(1.294) (1.269) (1.294) (-0.537) (-0.535) (-0.555) (-0.712) (-0.715) (-0.734)
NODAgdp -0.172** --- --- -0.105* --- -0.170*** ---
(-2.036) (-1.862) (-3.305)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.423** --- --- -0.234* --- --- -0.378***
(-2.062) (-1.829) (-3.251)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.289** --- -0.188* --- --- -0.305***
(-1.989) (-1.852) (-3.255)
Democracy 1.217*** 1.218*** 1.219*** 0.023 0.041 0.013 0.080 0.109 0.063
(4.845) (4.871) (4.801) (0.107) (0.193) (0.060) (0.405) (0.566) (0.313)
Public Investment -0.780 -0.755 -0.797 1.000** 0.980** 1.019** 0.788** 0.756* 0.819**
(-1.350) (-1.326) (-1.354) (2.343) (2.299) (2.371) (2.025) (1.953) (2.064)
Hausman-test 35.241*** 35.115*** 35.398*** 14.624*** 15.384*** 13.638*** 19.129*** 18.691*** 19.98***
OIR-Sargan test 1.286 1.231 1.361 0.042 0.212 0.000 0.186 0.789 0.002
P-value [0.256] [0.267] [0.243 ] [0.836] [0.644] [0.994 ] [0.665 ] [0.789] [0.959 ]
Cragg-Donald 3.020** 3.016** 2.983** 3.719** 3.645** 3.780** 3.719** 3.645** 3.780**
Adjusted R² 0.052 0.053 0.050 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.014
Fisher Statistics 10.827*** 10.957*** 10.567*** 3.723** 3.718** 3.652** 6.581*** 6.529*** 6.338***
Observations 447 447 447 584 584 584 584 584 584
First-Set of Instruments Constant; English; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Second-Set of Instruments Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income
*;**;***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1%  respectively.  ():  z-statistics  .  []:  p-values  corresponding  to  OIR-Sargan  test.   OIR:  
Overidentifying Restrictions test.  For the Cragg-Donald statistics the relative  bias is probably less than 5% since the critical value for TSLS bias 
over OLS is 0.00. NODAgdp: NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp:NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA  from DAC 
countries on GDP.  
As concerns the second-issue, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the OIR test in all 
regressions indicates that the instruments do not explain development dynamics through other 
mechanisms beyond NODA channels. Thus the instruments are valid and not correlated with the 
error term in the main equation; the instruments do not suffer-from endogeneity. We also provide 
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the Cragg-Donald statistics for the strength of the instruments at the first stage of the TSLS. The 
null hypothesis for weak instrument is rejected in all regressions, confirming the strength of the 
instruments. The control variables are significant with the right signs since democracy and public 
investment improve growth and human development. The analysis in Table 3 is replicated with 
the second-set of instruments for robustness in the results.
Table 4 below presents restricted TSLS results. First and foremost, the results for the 
Hausman-test confirm the choice of our estimation approach. Results of the  Cragg-Donald and 
Sargan-OIR tests confirm the strength and validity of the instruments respectively. While  the 
null hypothesis for weak instrument is rejected(the relative  bias is probably less than  5% since 
the critical value for TSLS bias over OLS is 9.53), the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan-OIR 
test is rejected. Broadly findings based on restricted regressions confirm those in Table 3 even 
after  they are replicated with an alternative set of instruments. In substance both the endogenous 
regressors and control variables are significant with the right signs. 
Table 4: Second-stage regressions(Restricted)
Human  Development GDP growth GDP per capita growth
NODAgdp -0.107 --- --- --- --- --- -0.184*** --- ---
(-1.589) (-4.041)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.274* --- -0.116** -0.260** --- --- -0.410*** ---
(-1.645) (-2.348) (-2.323) (-3.993)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.175 --- --- -0.208** --- --- -0.329***
(-1.535) (-2.329) (-3.974)
Democracy 1.118*** 1.119*** 1.119*** -0.010 0.009 -0.022 0.040 0.071 0.020
(4.714) (4.754) (4.688) (-0.051) (0.049) (-0.110) (0.221) (0.402) (0.110)
Public Investment -0.056 -0.056 -0.059 0.779*** 0.759*** 0.790*** 0.520*** 0.488*** 0.538***
(-0.391) (-0.394) (-0.409) (7.223) (7.441) (7.035) (5.263) (5.229) (5.173)
Hausman-test 59.718*** 60.848*** 58.845*** 46.555*** 47.966*** 45.426*** 22.303*** 21.634*** 22.657***
OIR-Sargan test 3.009 2.889 3.111 0.369 0.557 0.345 0.765 1.425 0.600
P-value [0.222] [0.235] [0.211] [0.831] [0.756] [0.841] [0.682] [0.490] [0.740]
Cragg-Donald 15.651** 15.643** 15.289** 17.469** 17.788** 16.785** 17.469** 17.788** 16.785**
Adjusted R² 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.013
Fisher Statistics 16.329*** 16.557*** 16.082*** 86.000*** 86.947*** 84.351*** 27.897*** 28.126*** 26.800***
Observations 447 447 447 584 584 584 584 584 584
First-Set of Instruments Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Second-Set of Instruments Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income
*;**;***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1%  respectively.  ():  z-statistics  .  []:  p-values  corresponding  to  OIR-Sargan  test.   OIR:  
Overidentifying Restrictions test. For the Cragg-Donald statistics the relative  bias is probably less than 5% since the critical value for TSLS bias 
over OLS is 9.53. NODAgdp: NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp:NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA  from DAC 
countries on GDP.  
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4.3 Further discussion, caveats and policy implications 
Findings in this paper do not provide much grounds for the hope that  Western aid can 
save Africa.  Perhaps current  views on the roots  of  poverty in  Africa  are  too simplistic  and 
attempts to change these root causes have underestimated the difficulty of doing so from the 
outside. The failure of the West’s attempted rescue through aid does not necessarily imply a 
disastrous outlook for Africa. Africans on their own will have to achieve economic and political 
changes that promote African economic development and some of these changes are already on 
course(such as the movement towards freer markets and the expansion of democracy). There are 
therefore hopeful signs of the growth of enterprise in Africa. The explosion of cell phones for 
example  has  enabled  Africa  edge  the  phase  of  fixed  phones  in  the  development  process. 
Economic development in Africa depends on African private sector entrepreneurs, African civic 
activists and African political reformers… not on what ineffective, unaccountable, bureaucratic , 
poorly informed  and unmotivated outsiders do. 
So if anything, what can the West do for Africa? Just because the West cannot save 
Africa  does  not  logically  imply  there  is  nothing  the  rich  countries  can  do  for  the  African 
continent.  The  evidence  in  the  literature(Easterly,  2005a)  suggests  that  aid  has  been  more 
successful  at  delivering  tangible  outcomes  like  education,  health  and  water.  The  micro 
development  literature  using randomized controlled  trails  also finds  positive  effects  of some 
specific development interventions from foreign aid.  In a nutshell the West cannot save Africa, 
but foreign aid can still be beneficial to recipient countries in a piecemeal way to alleviate the 
sufferings of those desperately poor. 
More  modest  goals  from  aid  in  Africa  would  make  it  easier  to  hold  aid  agencies 
accountable  for  the  results  of  aid-targeted  projects.  The  sweeping  ambitions  of  the  current 
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Western aid efforts in Africa do not lend themselves to accountability, since for the most part the 
outcome depends on many other factors beside aid agency efforts and attempts to isolate the 
effects of these efforts have proved fruitless. More accountable agencies might  be encouraged to 
make more progress on piecemeal  interventions.  These modest  goals would render the West 
much  less  intrusive  in  Africa,  thus  ending  the  historical  tendency  towards  ever-increasing 
escalation of Western interventions in the continent. This could be an appealing prospect because 
the intrusive Western role has made African governments accountable to external actors instead 
of their own citizens. It follows that insiders have better information and incentives to solve their 
own problems than outsiders do. Arguably,  local democracy that eases citizen feedback have 
proven to be a more effective vehicle for good government than outside pressure. On a final 
note, the more intrusive large-scale interventions have lots of unintended consequences that are 
hard to evaluate, many of which could be detrimental. 
Perhaps the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can 
possibly know. As Hayek(1988)  suggested “the curious task in economics is to demonstrate to  
men how little they know about what they imagine they can design”. The escalation of Western 
interventions in Africa demonstrates an arrogance in the face of very imperfect knowledge. Once 
economists  discard  arrogance,  there  is  hope to  hold  donors  accountable  for  such piecemeal 
outcomes  as  well-maintained  roads,  medicines,  water  supply,  textbooks  and  nutritional 
supplements to improve the well-being of the poorest people in the world. It is thus a momentous 
time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is time for economists and policy makers to 
start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up 
to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for results. 
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5.Conclusion
Past research on the  African aid-growth(development) nexus has been based on data 
collected before the year 2000  and mostly focused on growth. Literature investigating the effect 
of aid on human development presents the shortcoming of using an index that is unadjusted for 
inequality.  This  paper  has  used  more  updated  data(1996-2010)  and  the  Inequality  adjusted 
Human  Development  Index   first  published  in  2010  to  complement  existing  literature.  The 
findings broadly indicate that development assistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per 
capita growth and human development. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs,  the 
relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in 
Africa. 
Perhaps the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can 
possibly know. As Hayek(1988)  suggested “the curious task in economics is to demonstrate to  
men how little they know about what they imagine they can design”. The escalation of Western 
interventions in Africa demonstrates an arrogance in the face of very imperfect knowledge. Once 
economists  discard  arrogance,  there  is  hope to  hold  donors  accountable  for  such piecemeal 
outcomes  as  well-maintained  roads,  medicines,  water  supply,  textbooks  and  nutritional 
supplements to improve the well-being of the poorest people in the world. It is thus momentous 
time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is time for economists and policy makers to 
start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up 
to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for results.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Development 
Assistance 
Net Development Assistance(NODA) 10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704
NODA from Multilateral Donors   4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704
NODA from DAC countries  6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704
Growth & 
Development 
Human   Development 1.351 6.341 0.127 47.486 551
GDP growth 4.822 7.351 -31.30 106.28 744
GDP per capita growth 2.380 6.754 -33.07 90.140 753
Control 
Variables
Population growth 2.359 1.015 -1.081 10.043 780
Regulation Quality -0.673 0.673 -2.729 0.905 620
Democracy 2.307 4.089 -8.000 10.000 735
Public Investment 7.489 4.535 0.000 39.984 641
Instrumental 
Variables
English Common-Law 0.384 0.486 0.000 1.000 780
French Civil-Law 0.615 0.486 0.000 1.000 780
Christianity 0.634 0.481 0.000 1.000 780
Islam 0.365 0.481 0.000 1.000 780
Low Income 0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 780
Middle Income 0.423 0.494 0.000 1.000 780
Lower Middle Income 0.230 0.421 0.000 1.000 780
Upper Middle Income 0.192 0.394 0.000 1.000 780
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis
Growth and Development Development Assistance Control Variables Instrumental Variables
HDI GDPg GDPpcg TA MLD DAC Popg Reg Demo PubI Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI
1.000 -0.026 -0.025 -0.072 -0.079 -0.060 -0.014 0.160 0.131 -0.151 0.185 -0.185 0.101 -0.101 -0.080 0.089 -0.081 0.231 HDI
1.000 0.987 0.053 0.073 0.034 0.335 0.058 0.059 0.117 -0.002 0.002 0.029 -0.029 -0.052 0.052 -0.000 0.067 GDPg
1.000 0.000 0.013 -0.008 0.187 0.106 0.075 0.115 0.013 -0.013 0.030 -0.030 -0.125 0.125 0.034 0.122 GDPpcg
1.000 0.900 0.955 0.368 -0.242 -0.031 0.195 -0.050 0.050 0.058 -0.058 0.450 -0.450 -0.265 -0.281 TA
1.000 0.733 0.400 -0.220 0.011 0.220 -0.035 0.035 -0.006 0.006 0.475 -0.475 -0.284 -0.293 MLD
1.000 0.304 -0.230 -0.056 0.141 -0.056 0.056 0.098 -0.098 0.382 -0.382 -0.222 -0.242 DAC
1.000 -0.195 -0.063 0.043 -0.107 0.107 0.008 -0.008 0.425 -0.425 -0.222 -0.296 Pog
1.000 0.519 0.078 0.134 -0.134 0.077 -0.077 -0.274 -0.274 0.106 0.231 Reg.
1.000 0.147 0.177 -0.177 0.163 -0163 -0.034 0.034 -0.162 0.228 Demo
1.000 -0.138 0.138 0.008 -0.008 -0.049 0.049 0.002 0.059 PubI.
1.000 -1.000 0.189 -0.189 -0.043 0.043 -0.057 0.115 Eng.
1.000 -0.189 0.189 0.043 -0.043 0.057 -0.115 Frch.
1.000 -1.000 -0.003 0.003 -0.153 0.167 Chris
1.000 0.003 -0.003 0.153 -0.167 Islam
1.000 -1.000 -0.639 -0.569 LI
1.000 0.639 0.569 MI
1.000 -0.267 LMI
1.000 UMI
HDI: Human Development Index.  GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg. GDP per capita growth.TA: Total  development assistance.  MLD: Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. DAC: Development 
Assistance Committee .  Popg: Population growth. Reg: Regulation quality. Demo: Democracy.  PubI:Public Investment.  Eng: English Common-Law. Frch: French Civil-Law. Chris: Christian Religion. LI:  
Low Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Sources
Net Development 
Assistance(NODA) 
NODAgdp NODA(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
NODA from Multilateral 
Donors 
NODAMDgdp NODAMDgdp(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
NODA from DAC Donors  NODADACgdp NODADACgdp(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Human  Development  HDI Human Development Index World Bank(WDI)
GDP Growth GDPg GDP Growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
GDP Per Capita Growth  GDPpcg GDP Per Capita Growth (annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Democracy Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Public Investment  PubI Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  DAC: Development Assistance Committee. 
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num.
Legal-origins 
English Common-Law Botswana,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles,  Sierra Leone, 
Somalia,  South  Africa,  Sudan,  Swaziland,   Uganda,  Zambia, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
20
French Civil-Law  Algeria,  Angola,  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, 
Congo   Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti,  Egypt,  Eritrea, 
Equatorial  Guinea,  Ivory  Coast,  Ethiopia,  Gabon,  Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe,  Senegal, 
Togo, Tunisia.
32
Religions Christianity 
Angola,  Benin  ,Botswana,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde, 
Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic 
Republic,  Ivory  Coast,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Eritrea, 
Gabon,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi, 
Mauritius,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Rwanda,  Seychelles,  Sao 
Tome  &  Principe,  South  Africa,  Swaziland,  Togo,  Uganda, 
Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
33
Islam Algeria,  Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  Djibouti,  The  Gambia,  Egypt, 
Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea,  Libya,   Mali,  Mauritania,  Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia.
19
Income Levels
Low Income Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo  Republic,  Congo   Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti, 
Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  The Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea, 
Kenya,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,   Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mozambique,  Niger,  Rwanda,   Sierra  Leone,  Somalia,  Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
30
Middle Income Algeria,  Angola  ,Botswana,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde,  Egypt, 
Ivory  Coast,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Gabon,  Lesotho,  Libya, 
Mauritius,  Morocco,  Namibia,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  Seychelles, 
Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
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Lower Middle Income Angola,  Cameroon,  Cape Verde,  Egypt,  Ivory Coast,  Lesotho, 
Morocco,  Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
11
Upper Middle Income Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya,  Mauritius, 
Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa. 
10
Num: Number of  countries 
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